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Abstract 
I use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the effect of excise taxes on cigarette 
smuggling. The IV approach addresses the potential endogeneity of excise taxes while 
controlling for other determinants of smuggling. I use panel data on 47 states from 1990-
2009. The main results confirm the validity of the instrument, the percent of Democrats in 
the upper house of state legislatures, but do not reject exogeneity of excise taxes. 
Robustness tests using an alternative measure of cigarette smuggling find the opposite 
result. All models find that per capita income and the number of federal police per 
100,000 residents are significant determinants of smuggling. 
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Section I: Introduction 
Tobacco taxation is prevalent both in the US and worldwide: the World 
Health Organization (WHO 2010) finds that only 17 of 182 countries do not have 
cigarette excise taxes. The nicotine in cigarettes is physically addictive and smoking 
comes with a variety of health costs to the smoker (e.g. lung cancer) and to others 
(i.e., from second-hand smoke). Taxes are a way of internalizing the negative external 
effects of smoking.  Higher prices caused by taxes are shown to be effective in 
reducing smoking among youth, young adults and persons of low socioeconomic 
status (Bader et al, 2011). Nonetheless, estimates of the price elasticity of demand, 
with a median of -0.4 based on Gallet and List (2013), indicate that the demand for 
cigarettes is relatively inelastic. Taxing an inelastic good generally raises more 
revenue than an elastic one, although the reduction in consumption of the good in 
response to the tax is smaller. Given the prospects for internalizing the negative 
externality and raising tax revenue, it is no surprise that cigarette taxation is so 
popular among states. 
 However, taxation comes with an important unintended consequence: it 
creates an incentive to smuggle to avoid higher prices. Most studies find that the 
leading cause of tobacco smuggling is that geographic differences in cigarette taxes 
(e.g. between states) create incentives to smuggle to bypass the relatively higher 
taxes. Taxes average 50% of the retail price of cigarettes worldwide, and can be as 
high as 80% in some countries (WHO 2010), meaning that even small differences in 
excise taxes can significantly affect the price. Figure 1 illustrates substantial variation 
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in cigarette excise taxes across U.S. states in 2013. Virginia currently has the lowest 
tax at thirty cents per pack while New York has the highest at $4.35 per pack. 
Smugglers exploit these differentials for profits.  
Smuggling can occur through a variety of methods. “Casual” smuggling 
involves crossing state borders to lower-tax areas to illegally buy small quantities of 
cigarettes. Consumers in the US also can engage in casual smuggling by purchasing 
cigarettes on Indian reservations and military bases (Thursby and Thursby, 2000) 
where taxes do not apply, or by ordering online through websites that fail to collect 
state taxes. Commercial smuggling includes a variety of methods but generally 
involves transporting large quantities of cigarettes purchased from manufacturers or 
distributors in low-tax states to high-tax states. International Smuggling is the 
transportation of cigarettes across international borders without appropriate taxation. 
International smuggling is not as common in the U.S. as commercial and casual 
smuggling.
1
 The extent of smuggling is debatable but certainly significant, and the 
implications are serious. In setting taxes, legislators must account for the fact that 
some of the benefit of raising taxes is lost when smokers avoid them through 
smuggling.
2
 Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that smuggling may funnel 
profits to criminal organizations,
3
 lead to increases in violence, and require higher 
policing costs.
4
  
This paper explores the factors that explain variation in cigarette smuggling 
across U.S. states between 1990 and 2009 with a particular focus on the role of excise 
taxes. The paper’s main contribution is to examine whether or not excise taxes are 
endogenous to cigarette smuggling.  Most previous empirical models of smuggling 
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assume exogeneity of excise taxes.  If taxes are actually endogenous, then these 
models yield bias estimates of the true effect of excise taxes on cigarette smuggling. I 
hypothesize policymakers may choose to adjust the cigarette excise tax if they believe 
that cigarette smuggling is the result of high taxes and that smuggling is resulting in 
lost tax revenue or increased crime. If this is the case, then excise taxes are 
endogenous to cigarette smuggling.  
 To examine these questions, I use two measures of cigarette smuggling, an 
estimate produced by Lafaive et al. (2010) and the ratio of cigarettes consumed to 
reported sales. Using panel data for 47 continental states from 1990-2009, I regress 
the smuggling measures on a number of independent variables hypothesized to 
explain the variation in smuggling. I use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to 
account for the potential endogeneity of excise tax. My main results suggest that my 
instrument for excise taxes is valid, but find no evidence that excise tax is 
endogenous. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the 
previous literature related to my topic; Section III discusses the econometric model 
used in my analysis; Section IV details the data used in analysis; Section V discusses 
the regression results; and Section VI concludes with a discussion of my findings.  
Section II: Literature Review 
The previous literature shows that smuggling is widespread both in the U.S. 
and worldwide. Due to the difficulty of measuring smuggling directly, most studies 
infer the extent of smuggling by comparing expected demand with measurable 
quantities such as taxed sales and estimates of consumption obtained through surveys. 
Studies agree that smuggling is present, though its extent and determinants are 
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debatable. Merriman et al. (2000) estimate cigarette smuggling between European 
countries from discrepancies in reported imports and exports, expert’s estimates of 
smuggling, and price differentials between countries. Their model estimates that 
between 6% and 8.5% of worldwide cigarette consumption is smuggled. Yurekli and 
Sayginsoy (2010) estimate worldwide cigarette smuggling by identifying major 
smuggling routes and regressing sales data on organized smuggling incentives and an 
estimate cigarette demand.  Based on data from 110 countries, they estimate that 
cigarette smuggling accounts for roughly 3.4% of global cigarette consumption. The 
difference in values may be accounted for by the wider selection of countries in 
Yurekli and Sayginsoy’s data and the different empirical methods employed.  
A wide variety of studies confirm the presence of tobacco smuggling in the 
U.S. The vast majority infer smuggling using variables including excise tax 
differentials between states, distance from borders, and measures of enforcement. It is 
difficult to quote a single rate for tobacco smuggling in the U.S. due to the fairly wide 
distribution of results and variation in methods. For example, casual smuggling 
studies have produced several different sets of numbers. Baltagi and Levin (1992) 
estimate casual smuggling from panel data on 48 U.S. states during the period 1963-
1998. They assume that if home state sales go up when neighboring state prices 
increase, the result is due to border crossing. They find a 0.8% increase in home state 
sales for every 10% increase in neighboring state prices. Stehr (2005) performs a 
similar study comparing tax-paid sales and cigarette consumption data to find 
evidence of smuggling. Interestingly, he finds that 12.7% of cigarettes consumed in 
2001 were smuggled, but casual smuggling only accounted for 0.7% of sales in the 
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same year. The variation in these results may be partially driven by the significantly 
different empirical approaches used.
5
 
A more recent study by Lovenheim (2007) finds high estimates of border 
crossing, using data on price and distance from low price borders combined with 
micro data on smoking behavior. His results indicate that 13.1% to 25.1% of smokers 
engage in casual smuggling across borders and that cigarette demand is increasingly 
elastic to home state prices the closer one gets to the border. However, because the 
data covers only certain areas in each state (MSAs), he cautions that the results may 
not be generalizable. Finally, DeCicca, Sing, and Liu (2010) use a similar model to 
Lovenheim to compare micro data on distance from other state borders with surveys 
of smokers to determine the rate of excise tax avoidance. Because the survey asks 
about tax avoidance in buying cigarettes, this study directly observes smuggling 
behavior. They estimate that 5% of smokers engage in casual smuggling across 
borders, a much lower figure than Lovenheim but far more than earlier studies. 
Furthermore, they find that tax avoidance increases with higher taxes. However, their 
data covers only a small set of observations and must be interpreted cautiously.  
Accounting for commercial smuggling and using more detailed models results 
in still somewhat low but significant smuggling rates. Saba et al. (1995) estimate 
casual and commercial smuggling by examining a panel of state level cigarette sales 
data regressed on an estimate of cigarette demand by state. Their model includes 
variables for border crossing, smuggling from North Carolina,
6
 and tourism.  They 
found that 3%-5% of all smokers engaged in border crossing between 1973 and 1986, 
that commercial smuggling is statistically significant, and furthermore that cigarette 
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demand is more elastic than one would assume in the absence of smuggling. 
However, few states lost more than 1% of tax revenue to smuggling. A complex 
econometric model of commercial smuggling in the U.S. by Thursby and Thursby 
(2000) found similar results for commercial smuggling. In most years, they estimated 
between 3% and 7% of cigarette consumption is smuggled commercially.    
There has been no literature on Internet smuggling until recently. Goolsbee, 
Lovenheim, and Slemrod (2010) approach the issue of internet-based cigarette 
smuggling by regressing per-capita taxed cigarette sales on internet penetration, state 
excise tax, and several other variables. They find that high internet penetration results 
in significantly less sales within a state and a more negative price elasticity, implying 
that internet smuggling may be a significant factor.  
The paper that serves as the primary motivation for my model is by Lafaive, 
Fleenor, and Nesbit (2010). They estimated smuggling using data from 47 continental 
states from 1990-2009. Lafaive et al. use a complex model based on previous 
literature to create estimates for cigarette smuggling. Their first step is to create a 
“naïve model” of cigarette sales in each state, in which it is assumed that there is no 
smuggling and tax-paid sales are equal to consumption. Consumption is defined as:  
Cons=Smoke*Intensity*R  
where “Smoke” is the smoking rate in each state, “Intensity” is the average number of 
packs consumed per year by smokers, and “R” is a value between 0 and 1 that 
accounts for under-reporting of consumption. Their data on smoking prevalence are 
taken from the Center for Disease Control Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
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System (BRFSS) survey. Given the lack of reliable data on smoking intensity, they 
assume it does not vary across states and follows a linear trend.  
 If the naïve model is correct, then cigarette tax paid sales should match 
consumption. If there is variation in tax-paid sales not explained by consumption, 
then smuggling in or out of the state may account for it. Therefore Lafaive et al. 
examine the residuals of the naïve model based on several smuggling-related factors 
to explain the variation. Their model uses the average tax differential between home 
and border states while accounting for border population density to help explain 
casual cross-border shopping. They also use dummy variables for the presence of 
Indian reservations or shared borders with Canada and Mexico. To explain 
commercial smuggling, they follow the previous literature in assuming North 
Carolina is the main source of commercially smuggled cigarettes and include a term 
for the tax differential between NC and the home state. Therefore there is no estimate 
for smuggling in North Carolina as it is excluded to create the above measure for 
commercial smuggling. All variables were significant at the 1% level, with the 
exception of the Canadian border dummy variable, which was not significant. 
 Given the coefficients of the regression, they estimate “pre-
smuggling” sales, which is the difference between tax-paid sales and the estimated 
volume of smuggling in or out of the state. This is taken as a measure of the in-state 
consumption if smuggling had not occurred. The final estimates of smuggling are 
given as the percent of sales that are smuggled in each state. If a state imports 
smuggled cigarettes, the value of smuggled sales in negative, as it causes observed 
sales to be less. If the state is a smuggled cigarette exporter, the value is positive. 
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Few papers examine whether or not there are non-tax incentives related to 
cigarette smuggling. Goel (2008) approaches the question of cross-sectional 
differences in state smuggling rates by estimating the effects of both price and non-
price incentives on cigarette smuggling. His model examines price differentials on the 
border as well as factors including average education, literacy, corruption and 
policing. His model finds income to be significant in one case, but price differential is 
the strongest effect across all of his regressions.  
The literature on public choice theory raises the issue of the potential 
endogeneity of taxes. Olson (1965) argues that a small interest group might organize 
more effectively than large ones and thus can secure beneficial taxes or subsidies. 
Stigler (1971) expands on Olson by arguing large firms can always out-lobby 
consumer groups in setting regulations, and Peltzman (1976) goes further by 
examining the political incentives a legislator faces for giving or denying tax benefits 
to a firm. All these theories contrast with the original assumption that taxes and 
subsidies are made in a way that maximizes public interest. Smith (1982) wrote two 
papers based on public choice theory which examine why liquor license regulations 
differ across states. Her findings suggest that regulations are correlated with the 
presence of certain interest groups and the size of voter districts. This gives support to 
the idea that policymaker’s decisions reflect incentives other than those associated 
with maximizing public interest.  
 As policymakers in public choice theory consider all the costs and benefits in 
making regulations, I expect that lawmakers will set excise taxes considering not only 
health and tax revenue but also the prevalence of smuggling. Excise taxes may also 
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reflect omitted variables such as attitudes towards smoking, household income, the 
percent of population of smoking age, or other possible determinants. If this is the 
case, then excise tax is endogenous to the model and causality is difficult to 
determine. Furthermore, it is possible that non-tax factors excluded by many models 
have a significant relationship with smuggling. By examining these possibilities, I 
hope to shed further light on the nature of cigarette trafficking. 
Section III: Model 
 Figure 2 shows the relationship between average real cigarette excise taxes 
and smuggled cigarettes as a percent of sales (taken from the Lafaive et al. estimates) 
over time for the time period I analyze, 1990 to 2009.  The figure suggests that over 
this time period, cigarette taxes and smuggling both increased. To further examine 
this relationship, I estimate several regression models based on my hypotheses in 
Section III. All models use heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors.    
I begin by estimating a basic linear or ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of 
my independent variables on the dependent variable of smuggling. For this 
regression, I pool my data and, as a result, this regression does not account for the 
panel nature of my data.  It is intended to illustrate the basic relationships among 
variables. Simple OLS regression is defined as: 
Yi=X i
’ß+ɛi 
where Yi is the dependent variable, X i
’ 
is a vector of independent variables with 
coefficients ß, and ɛi is the error term. Because my data are a panel over the years 
1990-2009, I follow by using state fixed effects in my regression,
7
 meaning a dummy 
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variable for state is included for each state in my sample. A fixed effect regression 
appears as:  
Yit=X it
’
ß+γi+ɛit 
where γi is the state dummy variable and t is the year of the observation.  
Finally, I use a panel two stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable 
regression with state fixed effects to account for the possibility that taxes are 
endogenous. An instrumental variable regression is useful when the coefficient for 
one independent variable is correlated with the error term of the regression. This can 
occur for several reasons, one being that the dependent variable may directly affect 
the independent variable, or they may be determined simultaneously. Correlation with 
the error may also occur if excise taxes and smuggling are driven by omitted variables 
or if there is substantial measurement error. OLS will not produce consistent 
estimates if any variable is correlated with the error term. An instrumental variable is 
one that is a determinant of the endogenous variable, in this case excise tax, without 
being itself a determinant of the dependent variable or being correlated with other 
determinants of it. 2SLS requires 2 conditions to be valid:   
i. There must be at least as many instrumental variables as there are 
endogenous variables in the original regression, or the model will not be 
identified 
ii. The IV is correlated with the endogenous variable conditional on all other 
exogenous variables in the original regression 
The two stages of a 2SLS regression are defined as: 
1
st
 stage: Zit=Vit
’α+ μit 
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2
nd
 Stage: Yit=X it
’
ß+δZit+ɛit 
where Zit is the endogenous variable, excise tax, with coefficient δ, Vit
’
 is a vector of 
instruments explaining Z with coefficients α, and μ is the error term of the first stage 
regression. I use the percentage of democrats in the upper and lower houses of the 
state legislature as the instrumental variables. 
Section IV: Data 
The first dependent variable for my model is an estimate of the percent of 
cigarette sales that are smuggled, as produced by Lafaive et al. The data cover 47 
continental states from 1990-2009, excluding the District of Columbia and North 
Carolina. The estimates are given as the percentage of sales that are smuggled, with a 
negative value if the state is importing smuggled cigarettes and a positive value if it is 
exporting them. 
 My second dependent variable is the ratio of cigarettes consumed per capita in 
each state over the number of recorded cigarette sales per capita. I use this as a rough 
estimate of smuggling, as a mismatch between reported consumption and sales may 
be explained by smuggled cigarettes. The primary purpose is to create an estimate 
that can be compared to the Lafaive et al. measure, as data for consumption are sparse 
and involve multiple assumptions. Cigarette consumption is measured as number of 
cigarettes smoked daily. Data are taken from the Tobacco Use Supplement to the 
Current Population Survey (TUS-CPS), a primarily self-reported survey of persons 18 
or older that is conducted by the U.S. Census. The survey is not conducted every 
year, but one observation per state is available for each of the two year periods 1992-
1993, 1995-1996, 1998-1999, 2001-2002, and 2006-2007. I assume that the 
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consumption value for each two year period is the same in both of the two years. 
Sales data are given as the annual number of cigarette packs sold per capita. Data for 
sales are taken from “The Tax Burden on Tobacco,” a publication made by the 
consulting firm Orzechowski and Walker. As the units are not comparable, I adjust 
cigarettes consumed to be an annual value, and adjust sales data to be in cigarettes 
rather than packs. In doing this I assume that there are 20 cigarettes per pack, an 
assumption I borrow from the TUS-CPS survey. The ratio shows an enormous 
mismatch between sales and consumption, with an average ratio of 4.08 across all 
years, though with a substantial standard deviation of 1.24. It is likely that the data 
collected by TUS-CPS are not representative, considering that the average respondent 
reports smoking nearly a pack a day. Furthermore, the ratio is never below 1, which 
would be expected in states that export large numbers of cigarettes and thus have 
more sales than consumption. There is still some correspondence between this ratio 
and the Lafaive et al. measure. For example, in 2007 New York had one of the 
highest estimated percentages of imported cigarettes (29.25%) and one of the highest 
ratios of consumption to sales (8.7). Likewise, states which tend to export smuggled 
cigarettes tend to have a ratio below the mean. In 1995, smuggled cigarette exports 
accounted for 18.87% of sales in New Hampshire, which also had a ratio of 
consumption to sales of 1.9. I do not consider this measure of smuggling to be 
superior to the Lafaive et al. model. Rather, I intend to use it for comparison 
purposes. I expect that both models will reach similar conclusions, assuming they 
both reflect smuggling. As negative and positive values in the Lafavie et al. model 
indicate smuggling import or export, it is difficult to interpret the coefficients of 
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regressors. Using the ratio of consumption and sales, it is clear that an increase in the 
ratio implies a larger amount of smuggling, while a decrease implies the opposite. 
Therefore, I can better infer what the actual direction of the effect of a variable is if 
both models come to the same conclusion about how it affects smuggling. 
To further explain the variation in smuggling, I use a set of variables not included 
in the Lafaive et al. model. Table 1 provides descriptions and summary statistics for 
the variables included in my analysis.   
State cigarette excise taxes are considered the main determinant of smuggling and 
therefore I include them in my model. U.S. state excise taxes are given in dollars per 
pack of cigarettes, adjusted to real dollars in 2009. Data for excise taxes are taken 
from the publication, “The Tax Burden on Tobacco,” which is funded in part by major 
cigarette companies including the Lorillard Tobacco Company and Reynolds 
American.  I compared these data to census data and find that the excise tax data are 
unbiased and accurate. I expect that high excise taxes will be correlated with larger 
amounts of smuggling because high taxes raise the price of cigarettes within the state 
and incentivize smuggling.  
 I include per capita income to control for how the wealth of the population 
affects smuggling. Per capita income represents the total reported annual income of 
state residents divided by the population size. Data for all states are taken from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis survey data and are in real dollars for the year 2009. 
There is significant variation in the average per capita income across states: 
Mississippi reported the lowest value in 2009 at $30,013 while Connecticut reported 
the highest at $52,900. I expect that higher per capita income will correlate with 
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lower smuggling, as wealthier consumers will likely not be as sensitive to price and 
thus not seek out smuggled cigarettes.  
 I use percent of the population with a high school degree or higher to 
represent educational attainment for each state. These data give the percent of adults 
in each state who have graduated high school or any higher institution. The data are 
available from the US statistical abstract from 1990, 1998-2000, and 2002-2009. For 
unobserved years I assume that the change between two observed periods occurred 
evenly across the unobserved years. These data in particular must be viewed with 
caution as there are no observations between 1990 and 1998, a long period to make 
such an assumption over. There is not much variation between states in education; for 
example, Texas has the lowest percent of high school graduates in 2009 at 79.9%, 
while Wyoming has the largest at 91.8%. Education may affect smuggling through 
demand, as more educated people may be more likely to understand the dangers of 
smoking and avoid it. Previous research has also found a negative relationship 
between education and propensity to engage in crime (Lochner et al., 2004), which 
may imply that educated populations will be less likely to participate in the black 
market for cigarettes. Therefore I expect that higher levels of education will result in 
lower amounts of smuggling. 
 I use federal police per 100,000 residents as one proxy for the degree of law 
enforcement in a state. These data are given as the number of full time officers with 
federal arrest and firearm authority per 100,000 residents. Data are from the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics Census of Federal Law Enforcement Officers, a survey covering 
73 agencies. Survey data are available for 2008, 2004, 2002, 2000, 1998, 1996, and 
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1993. For unobserved years I assume that the change between two observed years 
occurs in equal amounts across the intervening unobserved periods. For example, if 
2002 has 15 officers and 2004 is 17 officers, I assume the unobserved year 2003 has 
16.  As it may be the case that larger numbers of police make smuggling more 
difficult, I expect this variable to have a positive relationship with the estimated 
number of cigarettes smuggled.  
 I use local police per 100,000 residents as my second proxy for law 
enforcement within each state. These data are given as the number of full time state 
and local law enforcement personnel per 100,000 residents. These numbers are drawn 
from the Bureau of Justice Statistic’s Census of State and Local Law Enforcement 
Agencies, which is given every 4 years since 1992. Data are currently available for 
2008, 2004, 2000, 1996, and 1992. For unobserved years I assume that the change in 
two observed years occurs in equal amounts across all intervening unobserved years, 
as in the federal police variable. There is substantial variation across states: Louisiana 
has the highest average at 492 police per 100,000 residents while West Virginia has 
the lowest with 225. There is substantial variation across time as well. As with the 
federal police variable, I expect that higher numbers of local police per capita will 
result in less smuggling.  
 The percent of adults in the state population is included because it may have a 
relationship with smuggling through demand. The majority of smokers are adults, so I 
expect that a larger portion of adults within a state will result in higher demand for 
cigarettes and a larger amount of smuggling. Furthermore, adults can legally drive 
and thus a larger adult population would be more capable of crossing borders to evade 
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excise taxes. Percent of adults in the population of each state are calculated as the 
number of people 18 or older divided by the entire state population, given for the 
years 1990-2009. Data are collected by University of California Santa Barbara and 
available through the Center for Disease Control (CDC). There is little variation 
between states: Wisconsin has the highest average percentage at 77.56% adult, while 
Utah has the lowest at 67.27%. The average standard deviation for each state over 
time is only 1.08%, showing that the percent of adults in each state changes little over 
the sample time period.    
 I use the presence of laws against advertising tobacco as a proxy for attitudes 
towards cigarettes in each state. It is a binary variable with a value of 1 if a state has 
laws restricting tobacco advertisements and 0 if it does not. Types of restrictions 
include banning billboards, restrictions on billboards near schools or churches, 
prohibition of advertising on public transportation, and several more. These data are 
collected by the CDC Office of Smoking and Health (OSH). There is little variation 
across time in this variable, as most states do not vary their advertising laws 
frequently. For example, the percent of states with advertising restrictions has held 
constant at 40.4% since 1999. I believe that the presence of advertising restrictions 
indicates a generally hostile attitude towards smoking in each state, and that the 
presence of restrictions will be correlated with lower amounts of smuggling. States 
that are hostile to smoking may be more serious about prosecuting smugglers for 
bringing in cigarettes. They may also demand fewer cigarettes generally, making such 
states unattractive targets for smugglers.   
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 I include the number of corruption convictions for state and local officials as a 
proxy for corruption in each state. This value is given as the total number of 
convictions of state and local officials per year in each state. Data are available from 
the Department of Justice Public Integrity Section 2011 report to Congress. The 
number of corrupt cases varied significantly between states, Texas having the highest 
average number of convictions at 72.3 and New Hampshire having the lowest at 1.6. I 
expect that a larger number of corruption convictions will be correlated with a larger 
degree of smuggling. States with a reputation for corruption may attract smugglers 
who believe they are less likely to be prosecuted. A culture of corruption may lower 
the transaction costs of certain forms of smuggling, for example by making 
counterfeit tax stamps more available.  
 To create an estimate of a state’s reliance on tourism, I follow the method 
used by Saba et al. (1995). Essentially, I assume that states with a higher than average 
number of people employed in hotels have a larger amount of tourism. I use annual 
data on number of paid employees working in accommodation services from the 
Census County Business Patterns survey, available from 1998-2011. I adjust these 
data to find the per capita number of employees in each state, as well as the average 
for each year across the entire US. I take the ratio of accommodation employees per 
capita in each state over the average for the US in each year to find how each state 
compares to the average. I subtract 1 from the result so that a state with the average 
number of people employed in hotels is given a value of “0.” My expectation is that 
higher reliance on tourism will result in greater amounts of smuggling, as states with 
more accommodations will have more traffic flowing through them.   
18 
 
 I use percent of Democrats in the lower and upper house of the state 
legislature as instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity of excise taxes. 
The variables are calculated as the number of Democrats divided by the total number 
of legislators in each body, using data available from the Census’s US statistical 
abstracts. Observations are available for even years from 1990-2000, as well as 2001-
2003 and 2005-2011. In unobserved years, I make the assumption that the partisan 
composition of the legislature remains the same as the previous year. Furthermore, I 
omit Nebraska as the state has a non-partisan unicameral legislature.  
 It has long been a part of the Republican Party platform to oppose increases in 
taxes, while the Democratic Party has generally been more in favor of slightly higher 
tax rates to pay for government programs. Therefore, I assume that the percent of 
Democrats in the state legislature will affect taxes, most likely resulting in higher 
excise taxes than in states with more Republicans. I do not expect the percent of 
Democrats in each state to affect smuggling except through the mechanism of higher 
excise taxes. 
Section IV: Results 
Please see Tables 2 and 3 for the results of OLS and 2SLS  regressions, 
respectively. In summary, I find that my instrumental variable is valid for the Lafaive 
et al. model, but neither IV model is as efficient as OLS. Because of the panel nature 
of my data, fixed effects regression is the preferred model. The variables for excise 
tax, per capita income, and federal police per 100,000 residents are significant and in 
the expected direction for both dependent variables.  
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The pooled OLS regression results are mostly in line with my expectations, 
though some results do not match my hypotheses. Both pooled regression models 
explain over 60% of the variation in my two measures of smuggling. Across both 
dependent variables, real cigarette excise tax is significant at the one percent level and 
the coefficient is in the expected direction: an increase in tax results in an increase in 
the Lafaive et al. model’s estimate of imported cigarettes as well as an increase in the 
ratio of consumption to in-state sales. Per capita income is highly significant and in 
the expected direction: a $1000 increase in average per capita income results in a .6 
percentage point increase in the Lafaive et al. measure, implying that there is either 
less smuggling or more cigarette export.  
The consumption to sales ratio model indicates that higher per capita income 
results in a smaller ratio, suggesting a smaller amount of smuggling. However, the 
magnitude is negligible in the latter case. Federal and local police per 100,000 
residents are significant at 1% in both models, but with coefficients that suggest 
larger amounts of law enforcement per capita result in increased amounts of 
smuggling. This result is the opposite of my hypothesis, but may be a product of the 
pooled model as it disappears with fixed effects. The percent of adults in the 
population is significant at 1% and has an extremely large magnitude. This affect 
disappears in fixed effects regression. Corruption is significant in both cases and the 
coefficients are in the expected direction, though with small magnitudes. Tourism is 
only significant in the Lafaive et al. model, with the result that higher tourism is 
related to greater cigarette smuggling export or possibly less import.  
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 Fixed effects regression is a better match for my data, as I want to account for 
changes across states over time. This is evident in the ratio model as the R-squared 
increases by roughly 10%, though it actually decreases in the Lafaive et al. model by 
about 7%. The fixed effects model shows fewer independent variables to be 
significant, though those that were aligned mostly with my expectations. Excise tax 
remained significant at 1%, with the same direction and slightly smaller magnitude. 
Per capita income remained at the same level of significance for both models, though 
with greater magnitudes by nearly a factor of 10 in each case.  For example, a $1000 
increase in the average per capita income will result in a 1% increase in the Lafaive et 
al. estimate of smuggling. Federal police per 100,000 residents switches signs in both 
cases, and becomes barely significant at the 10% level in the Lafaive et al. model. 
This is more in line with my expectations, as it is now associated with fewer 
cigarettes smuggled into the state and a reduction in the ratio of cigarettes consumed 
over state sales. However, the magnitude is small in the case of the Lafaive et al. 
estimates, as a 1 officer per 100,000 residents increase correlates with only a .084 
percentage point increase in the Lafaive et al. estimate of smuggling.  
 My 2SLS regression on the Lafaive et al. estimates gave evidence that my 
instrumental variable is valid, but indicated that OLS remains the most efficient 
estimator. The first stage regression F-statistic for model is significant at the 1% level 
and the model explained 30.75% of the variation in excise taxes, suggesting that the 
regression is significant and the fit is good. The percent of Democrats in the upper 
house of the state legislature is statistically significant at the 5% level, giving 
evidence that it is a valid instrument. The percent of Democrats in lower house was 
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not statistically significant, likely because it has a very strong correlation with the 
percent of Democrats in the upper house (r=.82). An overidentification test of all 
instruments returns a p-value of .41, which fails to reject the joint null that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and are correctly excluded from the 
estimated equation. The underidentification test returns a p-value of .0023, rejecting 
the null that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor. 
Together these give strong evidence that the percent of Democrats in the upper house 
is a valid instrumental variable. However, an endogeneity test
8
 on excise tax variable 
returns a p-value of .36, which fails to reject the null that excise tax is exogenous. 
The consumption to sales ratio model is not significant and the instrument is 
not valid. While the model explains 74.89% of the variation in the ratio of per-capita 
cigarette consumption to per capita sales, the F-statistic of the first stage regression is 
too low to reject the null that all the regression coefficients are 0. This suggests that 
the regression model does not fit the data well. Furthermore, I find that neither of the 
instrumental variables is a significant determinant of excise tax, implying that they 
are not valid instruments in this case. This is confirmed by the underidentification test 
p-value of .21, which does not reject the null that the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the endogenous regressor. The overidentification test p-value is .68, which 
implies that the instruments are not correlated with the error term and are properly 
excluded. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the instruments are valid as 
overidentification tests are robust to weak instruments. The endogeneity test has a 
similar result to the Lafaive et al. model, giving a p-value of .64 which does not reject 
the null that excise tax is exogenous to my model of smuggling. 
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Please see Tables 4 and 5 for the OLS and 2SLS results of the model without 
the corruption variable. To test the robustness of my results, I drop the corruption 
variable because it significantly reduces the number of observations in my 
regressions. This change increases the observations for the Lafaive et al. and 
consumption to sales ratio models by roughly 200 and 140, respectively. Dropping 
the corruption variable has little effect on the Lafaive et al. predictions but 
significantly changes the outcome of the consumption to sales ratio model. For the 
Lafaive et al. dependent variable, the federal police per 100,000 residents variable 
loses its significance in the fixed effects model, and the education and tourism 
variables become more significant in the pooled regression. The F-statistic for the 
first stage of the Lafaive et al. 2SLS regression triples and both instruments become 
significant at the 1% level, implying that the instruments remain valid. There is no 
material change to the second stage regression results, except that the federal police 
variable is no longer significant and the per capita income variable loses some 
significance. The endogeneity test does not reject the null that tax is exogenous. 
The changes in the ratio model are more substantial. Reflecting the Lafaive et 
al. model, the variable for federal police becomes much less significant in the fixed 
effect regression. Tourism becomes significant at 10% across pooled and fixed effects 
regressions, and the variables for local police and advertising laws become more 
significant in the pooled regression. The F-statistic nearly triples for the first stage 
2SLS regression and instruments for the percent of Democrats in the lower and upper 
house are significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. This implies that the 
first stage regression is significant and the instruments are valid. The 
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underidentification test now rejects the null that the instruments are uncorrelated with 
the endogenous regressor and the overidentification test does not reject the null that 
the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and excluded correctly. This 
gives further evidence that the instruments are valid in this case. The endogeneity test 
rejects the null that tax is exogenous at the 10% level. The second stage shows excise 
tax to be strongly correlated with an increase in the ratio of consumption to sales, 
implying a larger amount of smuggling and keeping with my expectations and 
previous results. The per capita income variable is also significant at the 1% level but 
is associated with an increase in the ratio, which is not in line with my hypothesis. 
Federal police per capita is strongly correlated with a decrease in the ratio and thus an 
implied decrease in cigarette smuggling, as my hypothesis predicted.  
Section V: Conclusion 
 This paper examines two questions: whether or not cigarette excise taxes are 
endogenous to estimates of smuggling, and if there are other important determinants 
of smuggling besides taxes. My IV model finds a valid instrument for excise tax, but 
does not suggest that cigarette excise tax is endogenous to the estimates of smuggling. 
While this might suggest that the amount of smuggling does not have an effect on 
excise taxes, further research in this area is needed. Furthermore, my results suggest 
that variables measuring per capita income and federal police protection appear to be 
associated with lower amounts of smuggling. However, changing my model by 
dropping the variable measuring corruption resulted in a significant change in my 
results, suggesting that they are sensitive to the specification of my model. Future 
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studies should continue to explore the determinants of smuggling and the endogeneity 
of excise taxes.  
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APPENDIX: Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: State Excise Taxes, courtesy of the Tax Foundation
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Figure 2: Average Cigarette Excise Tax per Pack and smuggled cigarette consumption as a 
percentage of sales,* 1990-2009 
 
*: Estimates are taken from Lafaive et al. 2010. I adjusted their estimates by taking the percentage of smuggled 
cigarettes imported as a positive. Therefore in 2009 cigarettes smuggled into the state average 10% of sales.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE Label Mean SD Observations 
Total % Cigarette Sales Smuggled (estimate) - -3.15% 15.51% 940 
Ratio of Cigarette Consumption to Sales - 4.08 1.24 470 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Label Mean SD Observations 
pc Income ($) pcinc 28,016.40 7,233.05 940.00 
Tourism tourism -0.07 1.53 658.00 
Public Official Corruption Convictions corrupt 20.45 22.70 384.00 
Adult % of State Population adult 0.75 0.02 940.00 
% High School Diploma or Higher educ 0.84 0.06 940.00 
State and Local Police per 100,000 Residents  localpolice 327.31 77.21 748.00 
Federal Police per 100,000 Residents feds 26.36 16.60 752.00 
Excise Tax per Pack of Cigarettes ($) tax 0.53 0.50 940.00 
Laws Restricting Advertising (Binary) adlaws 0.38 0.49 705.00 
% Democrats in the Upper House  upperdems 0.52 0.16 920.00 
% Democrats in the Lower House lowerdems 0.52 0.17 940.00 
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 Table 2: Regression Results for Pooled and Fixed Effects regressions.   
  Dependent: Lafaive et al. Estimate Dependent: Consumption/Sales 
Variable Pooled Regression Fixed Effects Pooled Regression Fixed Effects 
tax 
 -.22***  
(.012) 
 -.17*** 
 (.016) 
 1.54*** 
(.13) 
 .91*** 
(.14) 
pcincome 
.0060***  
(.0014) 
.010*** 
 (.0037) 
.000042**  
(.000017) 
.00015**  
(.000059) 
feds 
 -.0015*** 
 (.00029) 
 .00084* 
 (.00049) 
 .015*** 
 (.004) 
 -.029*** 
 (.0069) 
localpolice 
 -.00037*** 
(.000095) 
  -.00029 
 (.00023) 
 .0025*  
(.0014) 
 -.0046  
(.0032) 
educ 
.0024  
(.0018) 
 -0.0032 
 (.0037) 
.000058  
(.025) 
 .13** 
 (.051) 
adult 
2.76*** 
 (.36) 
 -0.312 
 (.99) 
 -37.91*** 
 (6.55) 
 10.61 
 (15.039) 
adlaws 
 -.0054 
 (.014) 
 -.0071 
 (.0084) 
 .18 
 (.17) 
 -.96* 
 (.099) 
corrupt 
 -.00081*** 
 (0.00029) 
 -0.00022  
(.00022) 
 .0063* 
 (.0036) 
 -.0089 
(.0059) 
tourism 
.017**  
(.0067) 
.0053  
(0.0028) 
.019  
(.025) 
 -.18  
(.18) 
Constant 
 -2.19*** 
 (.34) 
 -.182  
(.58) 
 28.76*** 
 (5.096) 
 -17.79* 
(10.37) 
R-squared 63.11% 56.45% 67.14% 76.94% 
Observations 329 329 141 141 
 
*: Significant at the 10% level  
**: Significant at the 5% level  
***: Significant at the 1% level  
†: Per capita income is scaled by a factor of 1/1000. To use the Pooled Regression model as an example, a $1000 
increase in average per capita income results in a .6 percentage point increase in the Lafaive et al. estimate of 
smuggling.  
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Table 3: Instrumental Variable 2SLS Regression Results 
  Dependent: Lafaive et al. Estimate Dependent: Consumption/Sales 
Variable IV First Stage IV Second Stage IV First Stage IV Second Stage 
tax 
(Dependent 
 Variable) 
 -0.23*** 
(.062) 
(Dependent 
 Variable) 
 .63 
(.59) 
pcincome† 
.029* 
(.015) 
0.012*** 
(.0043) 
 -.000018 
(.000038) 
.00016*** 
(.000050) 
feds 
.0046 
(0.0032) 
0.0011* 
(.00062) 
.012 
(0.010) 
 -.026** 
(.011) 
localpolice 
.0037*** 
(.0013) 
 -.00013 
(.00027) 
.0038*** 
(.0029) 
 -.00042 
(.0029) 
educ 
.026 
(.017) 
 -.0014 
(.0038) 
.019 
(.043) 
 .14*** 
(.053) 
adult 
10.20* 
(5.29) 
 1.07 
(1.07) 
34.07 
(13.75) 
 20.28 
(22.65) 
adlaws 
 -.14 
(.12) 
 -.013 
(.016) 
 .18 
(.19) 
 -.96*** 
(.13) 
corrupt 
0.0014 
(.0021) 
 -.00016 
(.00029) 
0.0027 
(.0045) 
 -.0084 
(.0053) 
tourism 
.012 
(.018) 
.0057 
(.0086) 
 -.20 
(.15) 
 -.25 
(.22) 
upperdems 
1.21** 
(.61) - 
1.55 
(1.16) - 
lowerdems 
0.56 
(.58) - 
 -.19 
(1.05) - 
R-squared 30.75% 51.39% 45.83% 74.89% 
F Statistic 11.3 18.37 6.37 43.33 
Observations 322 322 138 138 
Underidentification 
Test Statistic†† 
13.31 
P=.0013 
3.11 
P=.21 
Overidentification 
Test Statistic††† 
.225 
P=.64 
.167 
P=.68 
Endogeneity Test‡ 
.752 
P=.39 
.225 
P=.64 
*: Significant at the 10% level  
**: Significant at the 5% level  
***: Significant at the 1% level  
†: Per capita income is scaled by a factor of 1/1000.  
††: The underidentification test returns the the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. 
†††: The overidentification test returns the Hansen J-statistic.  
‡: See endnote 8 for details of the endogeneity test. 
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Table 2: Regression Results for Pooled and Fixed Effects regressions. 
  Dependent: Lafaive et al Estimate Dependent: Consumption/Sales 
Variable Pooled Regression Fixed Effects Pooled Regression Fixed Effects 
tax 
 -.22***  
(.010) 
 -.17*** 
 (.014) 
 1.60*** 
(.11) 
 1.03*** 
(.093) 
pcincome 
.0044***  
(.0010) 
.0056** 
 (.0028) 
.038***  
(.011) 
.11**  
(.049) 
feds 
 -.0016*** 
 (.00024) 
 .00040 
 (.00044) 
 .016*** 
 (.0029) 
 -.014* 
 (.0072) 
localpolice 
 -.00037*** 
(.000070) 
  -.00012 
 (.00018) 
 .0025***  
(.00089) 
-.0022  
(.0029) 
educ 
.0035***  
(.0012) 
 .0016 
 (.0013) 
.0071  
(.015) 
 -.0017 
 (.011) 
adult 
2.52*** 
 (.27) 
 .35 
 (.78) 
 -29.72*** 
 (3.86) 
 6.95 
 (10.87) 
adlaws 
-.011 
 (.010) 
 .057 
 (.0051) 
 .219** 
 (.097) 
 -.61* 
 (.34) 
tourism 
.024*** 
(.0067) 
.014  
(0.0015) 
-.030*  
(.018) 
 -.30* 
(.16) 
Constant 
 -2.06*** 
 (.25) 
 -.52  
(.54) 
 22.11*** 
 (3.04) 
-4.20 
(6.90) 
R squared 63.30% 60.15% 67.55% 74.00% 
Observations 517 517 282 282 
*: Significant at the 10% level  
**: Significant at the 5% level  
***: Significant at the 1% level  
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Table 5: Instrumental Variable 2SLS Regression Results, Omitting Corruption 
Variable 
 
  Dependent: Lafaive et al Estimate Dependent: Consumption/Sales 
Variable IV First Stage IV Second Stage IV First Stage IV Second Stage 
tax 
(Dependent 
 Variable) 
 -.18*** 
(.025) 
(Dependent 
 Variable) 
 1.53*** 
(.30) 
pcincome† 
.037*** 
(.012) 
.006** 
(0.0024) 
 .27 
(.018) 
.093*** 
(.032) 
feds 
.0043* 
(0.0025) 
.00048 
(.00043) 
.0090* 
(0.0052) 
 -.019*** 
(.0055) 
localpolice 
.0012 
(.00090) 
-.00013 
(.00017) 
.0014 
(.0011) 
 -.0021 
(.0018) 
educ 
.024*** 
(.0063) 
.018 
(.014) 
.0099 
(.0078) 
 -.0035 
(.011) 
adult 
13.55*** 
(2.92) 
 .53 
(.59) 
16.81*** 
(5.33) 
 -1.87 
(8.81) 
adlaws 
-.065 
(.067) 
-.056 
(.027) 
 .059 
(.077) 
 -.58* 
(.32) 
tourism 
.0013 
(.0013) 
.014 
(.0089) 
-.046 
(.069) 
 -.27** 
(.11) 
upperdems 
1.29*** 
(.32) - 
1.03** 
(.41) - 
lowerdems 
0.93*** 
(.35) - 
 .86* 
(.46) - 
R squared 44.95% 59.96% 48.79% 69.28% 
F Statistic 34.85 26.29 18.65 49.95 
# Observations 506 506 276 276 
Underidentification 
Test Statistic†† 
45.35 
P=.0000 
17.70 
P=.0001 
Overidentification 
Test Statistic††† 
2.54 
P=.11 
.032 
P=.86 
Endogeneity Test‡ 
.09 
P=.76 
3.28 
P=.07 
*: Significant at the 10% level  
**: Significant at the 5% level  
***: Significant at the 1% level  
†: Per capita income is scaled by a factor of 1/1000.  
††: The underidentification test returns the the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. 
†††: The overidentification test returns the Hansen J-statistic.  
‡: See endnote 8 for details of the endogeneity test. 
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